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Self-Limitation by the United
Kingdom Parliament
By 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, Q.C.*
I Three Topical Issues
While it would be an exaggeration to say that the British Constitu-
tion does not exist at all, the fundamental principles of that Constitu-
tion become more elusive the more one searches for them. The prob-
lem to which this article is addressed is usually put in the form of the
question: Can the United Kingdom Parliament bind itself or its suc-
cessors for the future? It will be submitted that, if the inquiry is to
have practical value, the concept of "sovereignty" should be avoided and
the question should be discussed in relation to the concept of "self-lim-
itation." Until recently students of law in Britain have been asked to
discuss the doctrine of the "sovereignty" of Parliament in relation to
the Union between England and Scotland (which has not been a signifi-
cant practical issue in modem times, although it may become so if En-
glish nationalism develops in reaction to Scottish and Welsh national-
ism) and the Statute of Westminster 19311 (the repeal or disregard
of which by Parliament has never been a practical issue). But at the
present day there are three topical issues, none of them merely aca-,
demic in the pejorative sense; (1) membership of the European Com-
munities or "Common Market," (2) declarations in several acts of Par-
liament since the last war concerning the status of Northern Ireland as
part of the United Kingdom, and (3) whether the United Kingdom
ought to have a declaration of individual rights and, if so, how (if at
all) such a declaration could be protected against the legislature. This
last question is not a topical issue on the same plane as the other two,
but an increasing number of responsible people in Britain are advocat-
ing some kind of "new Bill of Rights."
The British Constitution is described variously as "unwritten,"
* M.A., B.C.L. (Oxon.). Formerly Dean of the Faculty of Law and Barber
Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Birmingham, England.
1. Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4.
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"part-written," "uncodified" or "evolutionary, '' 2 along with those of
New Zealand and Israel. The written elements in the British Consti-
tution, in relation to the unwritten, are liable to be exaggerated,3 be-
cause statutes affecting such fundamental institutions as the monarchy
and Parliament tend to regulate specific aspects of institutions that
would exist anyway at common law or by custom. It is not certain,
for example, whether the existence (as distinct from the composition)
of Parliament and the two Houses at the present day is the product of
the Union with Scotland Act4 and/or the Union with Ireland Act or
common law. Similarly with regard to relations between the two
Houses. Subject to the Parliament Acts, which Parliament could repeal
or amend, these relations are based on common law, that is in this con-
text parliamentary custom and privilege-a part of the common law not
derived from the decisions of the courts.
The controversy over continued membership in the Common Mar-
ket has arisen in this way. Adherence to the Europe-an Community
is implicitly intended to be permanent. On joining the Community,
member states are under an obligation to bring their internal law into
line with the existing Community law, and thereafter they are expected
not to enact laws inconsistent with Community law s, which relate
mainly to customs duties, agriculture, movement of labour and capital,
transport, restrictive trade practices and the regulation of the coal, steel
and nuclear energy industries. In addition to the treaties themselves
certain kinds of Community laws (regulations), existing and future,
take effect automatically in member states; other Community laws (di-
rectives, etc.) are to be implemented by member states themselves.
Self-executing regulations are a new kind of secondary legislation.
Courts of member states are to apply the interpretation put on the
treaties and other Community laws by the Court of Justice of the Com-
munities ("European Court"). By a volte-face on the part of the La-
bour party, which when in office in 1968-70 tried to negotiate entry
into the Common Market, they announced at the general election of
1970 (which the Conservatives won) that their official policy was op-
position to membership. The Conservative government signed at
Brussels in January 1972 a treaty of accession to the European Eco-
2. See Wolf-Phillips, Post-Independence Constitutional Change' in the Common-
wealth, 18 POL. STUDIES 18 (1970).
3. See, e.g., CONSnTITONS OF MODERN STATES 182-201 (L. Wolf-Phillips ed.
1968).
4. Union with Scotland Act 1706, 6 Anne, c. 11.
5. Union with Ireland Act 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67.
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nomic Community and certain related Communities (Treaty of Rome,
etc.) , and thereby became engaged also by certain other treaties.
Parliament implemented the treaties so far as concerns the law in the
United Kingdom by the European Communities Act 1972,7 which
came into force on I January 1973. After the act was passed the La-
bour party said it was now their policy if returned to power to "rene-
gotiate the terms of entry' 8 (semble, the terms of continued member-
ship), with the necessary implication that if a Labour government-
perhaps holding a unique referendum-were not satisfied with the re-
sult of such renegotiation then Britain would withdraw from the Com-
munity. Mr. Wilson confirmed this policy at the general election in
February 1974 (after which the Labour party returned to office), stat-
ing that if the renegotiation did not succeed, the existing treaty obliga-
tions would not be regarded as binding. International lawyers, as well
as the special breed of Community lawyers, would no doubt take the
view that such withdrawal without good cause and without the agree-
ment of all the other member states would be a serious breach of treaty
obligations. For constitutional lawyers the questions arise: Could Par-
liament under a Conservative government effectively entrench mem-
bership of the Common Market by requiring (say) a special majority
in the House of Commons for repeal of the European Communities
Act? Can Parliament while the United Kingdom is a member of the
Comunity effectively pass statutes which expressly or impliedly con-
flict with existing Community law in force in the United Kingdom?
Could Parliament under a Labour government repeal the European
Communities Act? Could Parliament go on to provide effectively that
the United Kingdom should not rejoin the Common Market unless a
bill to that effect were, for example, approved at a referendum? All
these are practical politico-legal questions at the present time.
The second topical issue is whether the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment is bound by section 1 of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act
1973 which states that:
It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland remains part of Her Ma-
jesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom, and it is hereby af-
firmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of it cease
to be part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom
without the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ire-
land voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section ... .
6. CMD. No. 4862.
7. European Communities Act 1972, c. 68.
8. The Times (London), Feb. 13, 1974.
9. Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, c. 36, § 1 (emphasis added).
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This act repealed section 1(2) of the Ireland Act 1949 which
provided that:
It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland remains part of His
Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom, and it is hereby
affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof
cease to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United
Kingdom without the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ire-
land.10
Is the United Kingdom Parliament prevented by the declaration
in the 1973 act, confirmed by the Northern Ireland Act 1974,11 from
providing for the inclusion of Northern Ireland or any part of it in the
Republic of Ireland, or for the separate independence of Northern Ire-
land, without the consent of the people of Northern Ireland in a ref-
erendum? These questions are significant not only for the protestant
majority and the catholic minority in Northern Ireland. but also for the
people in the remaining parts of the United Kingdom, many of whom
would now be only too glad to be rid of responsibility for the peace
and government of the unruly province.
It is not surprising that "liberal" associations whose members take
an anti-authoritarian attitude towards the rights of the individual should
advocate the enactment of a Bill or Declaration of Rights, even if they
have not paid much attention to the juristic problems involved; but the
matter deserves to be taken more seriously when senior members of
the judiciary in their extra-judicial capacity make similar proposals.12
There is no need here to recapitulate the familiar controversies con-
cerning the desirability and methods of drafting of a Declaration of
Rights in a country that has not already got one. The Bill of Rights
of 168913 was not a comprehensive document of this character, for
apart from such matters as the right of petitioning, excessive bail or
fines, cruel and unusual punishments and the due impanelling of jurors,
its declarations were confined to certain specific grievances of Parlia-
ment against the later Stuart monarchs. 4 The aspect to which atten-
tion will be drawn later is that of entrenchment against the legislature,
involving self-limitation by the United Kingdom Parliament, although
no more than a handful of politicans harassed by socio-economic prob-
lems are likely to foster public interest in the juristic puzzles involved.
10. Ireland Act 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 41, § 1(2) (emphasis added).
11. Northern Ireland Act 1974, c. 28.
12. See text accompanying notes 153 and 156 infra.
13. Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2, (1688).
14. E.g., Dispensing and suspending power; taxation and maintenance of an army
within the kingdom without consent of Parliament; freedom of parliamentary elections,
and of speech, debate and proceedings in Parliament.
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What is Parliament?
It must be asked: What is Parliament? And what is an act
of Parliament? "Parliament" means the Queen, the Lords and the
Commons in Parliament assembled. It has had this meaning ever since
its infancy nearly seven hundred years ago. During the brief Common-
wealth period in the seventeenth century both the monarchy and the
House of Lords disappeared, but both were revived at the Restoration
in 1660. That was a counter-revolution. The unions with Scotland
and Ireland may possibly impose a few limitations on Parliament.
There are statutory and customary rules for the summoning of the vari-
ous elements composing Parliament. 15  One Parliament lasts until it is
dissolved by the Queen on the advice of the prime minister or until
it expires by effluxion of time under the Parliament Act 1911.16 An
act of Parliament is a measure enacted by these three elements acting
together in the way customarily prescribed by themselves, namely, by
a simple majority of the members present and voting in each House
sitting separately,17 and assented to by the Queen.' 8  Every enactment
contains the customary formula that it is enacted by the Queen, by and
with the advice and consent of the Lords and Commons in the present
Parliament assembled, and by authority of the same. Modified enact-
ing formulae are used in finance acts and appropriation acts in the
passing of which the predominant part is taken by the Commons, and
in acts (very few in number) passed without consent of the Lords
under the provisions of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949.'9 Such
recital in what purports to be an act of Parliament is generally taken
to be conclusive so far as litigants are concerned.2 0  The question of
the authentication of acts of Parliament, which has arisen on rare oc-
casions in the past, is sometimes brought into discussions about the pos-
sible limitations on the "sovereignty" of Parliament, but authentication
15. E. MAY, PARLIAMENTARY PRACICE chs. 1, 2, 14 (18th ed. 1971).
16. Parliament Act 1911, 1 &2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 7.
17. The Commons have sat separately from the Lords since the reign of Edward
MI, in order that they might discuss grievances and taxation without being overawed by
the great men of the realm. It has been questioned whether the Lords and Commons
could pass a bill at a joint sitting, but if they each resolved to meet jointly-waiving
such privileges to the contrary that they may possess---it does not appear that either the
Queen or the courts could refuse to recognize a bill so passed.
18. Constitutional convention requires the Queen to give the royal assent to bills
passed by both houses.
19. Parliament Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 13, § 2; Parliament Act 1949, 12, 13
& 14 Geo. 6, c. 103, § 1.
20. See The Prince's Case, 80 Co. Rep. la, 77 Eng. Rep. 481 (K.B. 1606); Heath
v. Pryn, 1 Vent. 14, 15, 86 Eng. Rep. 11 (K.B. 1670).
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is more appropriately categorized by Erskine May as falling under
"subsidiary points in connection with legislative procedure."'"
The Meaning of the Questions
The meaning we give to questions of the kind, "Can Parliament
do that?" is, what would be the probable attitude of United Kingdom
courts in cases coming before them in the course of litigation if Parlia-
ment purported to do that? We are not concerned with vague doc-
trines of constitutional morality. In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-
Burke,22 the only appeal to come to the Privy Council from the colony
of Southern Rhodesia after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence,
Lord Reid referred to the convention that the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment did not legislate without the consent of the Rhodesian govern-
ment on matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly.
That was a very important convention but it had no legal effect
in limiting the legal power of Parliament.
It is often said that it would be unconstitutional for the United
Kingdom Parliament to do certain things, meaning that the moral,
political and other reasons against doing them are so strong that
most people would regard it as highly improper if Parliament did
these things. But that does not mean that it is beyond the power
of Parliament to do such things. If Parliament chose to do any
of them the courts could not hold the Act of Parliament invalid.23
Nor are we concerned with possibilities thought out by constitu-
tional or political theory. The recent discussion by Geoffrey Mar-
shall,24 for example, professedly consists of theoretical possibilities. We
are concerned here with the law operating in the Unitcd Kingdom, for
example, relating to the European Community and Northern Ireland,
so that discussion of the Statute of Westminster or Independence Acts,
which affected the law operating in the former "Dominions" and other
former dependent British territories, is largely beside the point. Mar-
shall exaggerates the power of British courts to propound and give ef-
fect to a "new" or "revised" theory of Parliament's legislative power.
25
British courts are not established as coordinate bodies with the legisla-
ture by a written constitution. The present system of courts and their
jurisdictions are based on acts of Parliament, 26 and judges of the Su-
21. E. MAY, supra note 15, at 556-59.
22. [1969] 1 A.C. 645 (S.R.).
23. Id. at 723.
24. CONsrrrTUONAL THEoRY 41-42 (Oxford 1971) [hereinafter cited as MARSHALL].
25. R. HEuSTON, ESSAYS iN CoNsrrruTIoNAL LAw ch. 1 (2d ed. 1964); Oxroma
ESSAYS IN JUIUSPRUDENcE ch. 8 (Guest ed. 1961).
26. E.g., Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act of 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.
5, c. 49; Appellate-Jurisdiction Act 1876 39-40 Vict., c. 59; Courts Act 1971, c. 23.
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preme Court and Lords of Appeal are dismissible on an address from
both Houses of Parliament. The House of Lords as the court of final
appeal is technically part of Parliament, and its president is the lord
chancellor who presides over the Upper House. As a minister and
a member of the cabinet the lord chancellor would ex hypothesi be
identified with the policy of any bills introduced into Parliament by the
government of the day. These considerations would not affect the
courts in their interpretation of acts of Parliament, but they might well
be relevant if any litigant challenged the validity of an act.
Concept of "Sovereignty" Discarded
Blackstone identified Parliament with the Sovereign, that legally
unlimited power that must exist in any state.17  Austin28 and Dicey29
elaborated and handed on this tradition. The juristic concept of sov-
ereignty has, of course, come under attack from many quarters. Ben-
tham early asserted that the authority of the supreme governor could
be limited by an express convention, and later allowed the possibility
that sovereignty might be divided between a supreme legislature and
the courts, thus giving rise to a consensus between the legislature and
the courts.3 0 However, the former proposition would presuppose a su-
preme international law, while the latter proposition would presuppose
a supreme constitution superior to both the legislature and the courts.
But Bentham's ideas on sovereignty underwent a continual transforma-
tion throughout his long writing career, sometimes in works that are
only now in course of publication, and he finished up with something
like the sovereignty of the people.31 Austin was logically more consis-
tent than Bentham about sovereignty, although he was not consistent
with himself about Parliament, probably because he was carried away
by the passing of the Reform Bill at the time he was delivering his lec-
tures. The tradition of mixing up discussions of the legislative power
of Parliament, which is a product of constitutional history, with the doc-
trine of sovereignty, a product of analytical jurisprudence, was con-
tinued by Salmond in an appendix to his Jurisprudence on "Sover-
27. 1 W. BLACKSTONB, COMMENTARIMS 51, 90.
28. J. AusTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, lect. 6 (Hart ed.
1954).
29. A. DIcEY, THE LAw OF THE CONSTrTTION, pt. 1, (10th ed. Wade 1959).
30. Hart, Bentham on Sovereignty 2 IR. JuR. (n.s.) 327 (1967).
31. Burns, Bentham on Sovereignty: an Exploration, 24 N. IR. L.Q. (1973). The
author of the article is general editor of the Bentham Project.
Spring 19751 SELF-I/=IATION
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
eignty."32 which survived through a number of editions but has been
omitted by the editor from the latest. This confusion reached the Su-
preme Court of South Africa in the well-known case of Harris v. Min-
ister of the Interior,83 in which the question was whether the South
African Parliament was still bound in 1951 by the entrenched sections
of the South Africa Act 1909,"4 the act of the United Kingdom Parlia-
ment which formed the basis of the South African Constitution and cre-
ated its Parliament. Since 1909 the Statute of Westminster 5 had been
passed, and also the Status of the Union Act (South Africa) 193436
in which the South African Parliament declared itself to be a "sover-
eign" Parliament. It had to be pointed out by Centlivres, C.J., that the
United States was a sovereign state but Congress was limited by the
Constitution.
More recently Geoffrey Marshall,8" exercising his liberties as a
political scientist, has given us an interesting discussion of various con-
stitutional theories about the possible powers of legislatures with regard
to "forms and procedures" and the related (but not identical) topic of
"sovereignty"; but the United Kingdom Constitution is no more based
on comparative constitutional theory than on analytical jurisprudence.
What is conceivably possible concerning legislative forms and proce-
dures is hardly a practical substitute for a long line of judicial dicta38
and the attitude taken for centuries by members of Parliament and the
legal profession. It would clarify this discussion if we avoided using
the term "sovereignty" in constitutional law. It begs the question,
which is, can Parliament limit its legislative power for the future? If
"sovereignty" is used merely for legislative competence it is ambiguous
and confusing. A better term is "legislative supremacy."
H Substance and Procedure in the Legislative Process
The legislative process may be divided into matters of substance
32. J. SALMOND, JuISPRUDENCE (11th ed. G. Williams 1957). But cf. F. MArr-
LAND, CONSTrrTuTiONAL HISTORY OF ENrGLAND 297-301 (Cambridge ed. 1908) therein-
after cited as MAr'LAND].
33. [1952] 2 S. Mr. L.R. 428 (A.C.), sub. nom. Harris v. DZ5nges [1952] T.L.R.
1245.
34. South Africa Act of 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 9.
35. Statute of Westminster 1931, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4.
36. Status of the Union Act (S.A.) 1934, No. 69 (repealed Republic of South
Africa Constitution Act (1961) No. 32, § 120).
37. MmASHALL, supra note 24, at 34-53. See also G. MARSHALL, PARLIAmEN-
TARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH (1957).
38. See, e.g., 0. HOOD-PsILLIPS, CONsTrTUTIoNAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 47-48
n.48 (5th ed. 1973).
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(subject-matter) and matters of procedure, a dichotomy accepted in the
exposition of almost any branch of a legal system. There is plenty of
judicial authority for saying that British courts do not concern them-
selves with parliamentary procedure, and this is also the established at-
titude of members of Parliament. Thus Lord Pearce said in Bribery
Commissioner v. Ranasinghe: "In the constitution of the United King-
dom there is no governing instrument which prescribes the law-making
powers and the forms which are essential to those powers."3 9  Each
House has the ancient privilege of exclusively controlling its own pro-
ceedings, the ordinary courts having no jurisdiction to deal with things
done in Parliament, except the commission of serious crimes or
breaches of the peace. The Houses themselves and Parliament as a
whole have privileges in the internal exercise of which they are re-
garded as courts superior to the ordinary courts of law.40 The matter
appears also to be covered in article 9 of the Bill of Rights: "[Piro-
ceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any
Court or place out of Parliament."41  The power of Parliament to re-
peal earlier acts expressly is so clear that it has not been questioned
in the courts. With regard to the implied repeal of an earlier act, coun-
sel was allowed by the Court of Appeal in Ellen Street Estates, Ltd.
v. Minister of Health42 to argue that such power might be excluded by
the provisions of an earlier act dealing with the same subject-matter,
though the court held that as a matter of interpretation of the earlier
act it was not necessary to decide the question; but Serutton, L.J., went
on to say that counsel's contention was "absolutely contrary to the con-
stitutional position that Parliament can alter an Act previously passed
. . . by enacting a provision which is clearly inconsistent with the
previous Act."43 Maugham, L.J., in the same case said:
The Legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as
to the form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Par-
liament to enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same
subject-matter there can be no implied repeal. If in a subsequent
Act Parliament chooses to make it plain that the earlier statute is
being to some extent repealed, effect must be given to that inten-
tion just because it is the will of the Legislature.44
39. [1965] A.C. 172, 195 (P.C. 1964) (Ceylon). Ceylon is now the Republic of
Sri Lanka.
40. See Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 12 Q.B.D. 271 (1884). See also 4 E. COKE, INMfl-
TUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 15.
41. Bill of Rights (1688), 1 W. & M. sess. 2, c. 2.
42. [1934] 1 K.B. 590 (1934); accord, Vauxhall Estates, Ltd. v. Liverpool Corp.
[1932] 1 K.B. 733 (Div. Ct.) (1931).
43. [1934] 1 .B. 590, 595 (1934).
44. Id. at 597.
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And Lord Reid in a recent address delivered to the Society of
Public Teachers of Law said: "It is good constitutional doctrine that
Parliament cannot bind its successors."45
The recent decision of the House of Lords in Pickin v. British
Railways Board40 was concerned with the question whether a private
act of Parliament,47 if it contained a false recital and Parliament was
misled by its being obtained ex parte as an unopposed bill, would be
effective to deprive the plaintiff of his land; but their Lordships' judg-
ments throw valuable shafts of light onto the background and context
of the subject-matter of this article, which of course concerns public
acts. Lord Reid quoted with approval the well-known dictum of Lord
Campbell (later chief justice and then lord chancellor) in an appeal
to the House of Lords from Scotland in Edinburgh and Dalkeith Ry.
Co. v. Wauchope:
All that a Court of Justice can do is to look to the Parliamentary
roll: if from that it should appear that a bill has passed both
Houses and received the Royal assent, no Court of Justice can
inquire into the mode in which it was introduced into Parliament,
nor into what was done previous to its introduction, or what
passed in Parliament during its progress in its various stages
through both Houses. I trust, therefore, that no such inquiry will
again be entered upon in any Court in Scotland, but that due
effect will be given to every Act of Parliament, private as well as
public, upon what 'appears to be the proper construction of its
existing provisions.48
Lord Reid in Pickin's Case added: "No doubt this was obiter
[semble, as regards public acts] but, so far as I am aware, no one since
1842 has doubted that it is a correct statement of the constitutional po-
sition." 49  The court has no concern, Lord Reid continued, with the
manner in which Parliament or its officers in carrying out its Standing
Order perform their functions. For more than a century both Parlia-
ment and the courts have been careful to avoid conflict between them.
The plaintiff was not entitled to go behind the act to show that the
section concerned should not be enforced, nor to examine proceedings
in Parliament in order to show that the Railways Board by misleading
45. 12 J. Soc'y PUB. TEAcHERS L. 25 (1972).
46. [1974] A.C. 765.
47. British Railways Act 1968, c. xxxiv. Private acts deal with local or personal
matters, for example, giving special powers to a municipal corporation or a public utility
corporation. They are promoted by petition to Parliament by interested persons or
bodies from outside Parliament, and their legislative procedure is governed by special
standing orders, which include the giving of notice to persons likely to be affected.
48. 8 Cl. & F. 710, 725; 1 Bell 252 (1842).
49. Id. at 278-79; [1974] 2 W.L.R. at 217.
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Parliament had caused him loss.50 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said
that in the processes of Parliament there would be much consideration
whether a bill should or should not in one form or another become
an enactment. When an enactment is passed there is finality unless
and until it is amended or repealed by Parliament. In the courts
there may be argument concerning the correct interpretation of an en-
actment; there must be none as to whether it should be on the statute
book at all.51 It would be impracticable and undesirable, Lord Morris
added, for the court to embark on an inquiry concerning the effective-
ness of internal procedures in the High Court of Parliament, or an in-
quiry in any particular case as to whether those procedures were ef-
fectively followed.52 Lord Wilberforce said he did not understand how
courts could inquire whether Parliament was misled by a recital. How
can one know how Parliament understood the recital-who is "Parlia-
ment" for this purpose-the members of both Houses or of either
House-the members of the committee on private Bills-the counsel
who advise the chairmen of those committees-the officials whose
business it is to look at recitals and at the Bill? We know nothing,
continued Lord Wilberforce, and by no process short of summoning
some or all of these persons and examining their records could we find
out what view of the facts or on what considerations of policy the sec-
tion concerned was enacted. 53 Lord Simon of Glaisdale said the most
peculiar feature in constitutional law of the British system of parlia-
mentary democracy is the sovereignty of Parliament. This involves
the courts having no power to declare enacted laws to be invalid.
A second concomitant of the sovereignty of Parliament is that the
Houses of Parliament enjoy certain privileges, which are part of the law
of the land. Among those privileges is the exclusive right to determine
the regularity of their own internal proceedings. This rule indeed is
reflected in article 954 of the Bill of Rights. The plaintiff's argument,
Lord Simon pointed out, would involve questioning proceedings in Par-
liament. The issues would not be fairly tried without infringement of
the Bill of Rights and of that general parliamentary privilege which
is part of the law of the land.55
Earlier cases in point include Ex Parte Selwyn5" where Canon Sel-
50. 2 W.L.R. at 217-18.
51. Id. at 219.
52. Id. at 220.
53. Id. at 226.
54. 1W. & M. Sess. 2, c. 2, art. 9.
55. [1974] 2 W.L.R. at 228.
56. 36 JusT. P. 54 (1872) (P.C.).
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wyn made an application to the court questioning the validity of the
Irish Church Act 1869517 on the ground that the giving of the royal assent
was ultra vires the Act of Settlemen 8 and the Coronation Oath made
thereunder. In refusing the application Cockburn, C.J., and Blackburn,
J., said that even if the petition were presented to the Queen and she
was disposed to listen to it, "there is no judicial body in the country
by which the validity of an act of parliament can be questioned." An-
other case is Hall v. Hall59 where the defendant was a Jacobite who
claimed that the Probate Act of 1857, on which the plaintiffs title to
a house was based, had not really received the royal assent as he chal-
lenged the royal succession since James II. The county court judge
said he could not ignore a statute that had been acted on for more than
eighty years, and in any event Parliament could validate all titles by
passing an indemnity act. County court cases are not now generally
reported because they are not regarded as being of much authority in
the development of English law, and the judge as reported twice
begged the question by referring to the "statute" and to "Parliament,"
as of course if the defendant's contention were correct, the measure
would not be a statute and the legislature would not have been lawfully
summoned. However, so few cases have been brought on fundamental
questions of this kind and most of the few that have been commenced
have probably sunk without trace in the preliminary stages before the
master as showing no reasonable cause of action, that no apology is
needed for citing this example from the English county courts.
A legislature may be unrestricted as regards the subject-matter of
legislation but limited as to the procedure whereby it is to legislate, per-
haps in relation to specific topics such as individual rights or amend-
ment of the legislative procedure itself. Sir Ivor Jennings60 and others
have argued from this that the United Kingdom Parliament might be
held to be in this position, so as to be or to become bound by the "man-
ner and form" (Jennings) or "forms and procedures" (Marshall) to be
followed in certain legislative fields. They commonly cite in support
such cases as Attorney-General of New South Wales v. Trethowan0 '
and Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe;62 but the former was an
appeal from New South Wales and was professedly decided on the basis
57. 32 & 33 Vict., c. 42.
58. 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (1700).
59. 88 Sol. J. 383 (1944) (comment on case heard in Hereford County Court).
60. 1. JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CoNSTTrrnON ch. 4 (5th ed. 1959).
61. [1932] A.C. 526 (P.C. 1964) (Appeal Australian High Court).
62. [1965 A.C. 172 (P.C. 1964) (Ceylon).
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of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865,63 which still applied to that
state, and the latter was an appeal from Ceylon based on the written
constitution of Ceylon in force at that time. Such cases afford no sup-
port for arguing that the United Kingdom Parliament can limit itself
by procedural requirements, such as a special majority in the legislature
or a referendum.
Jennings and Heuston 64 have also argued in the alternative that
a requirement such as a referendum or the approval of the Northern Ire-
land Parliament constitutes a change in the composition of the legisla-
ture for the given purpose, and so would bind Parliament in that way.
With regard to the status of Northern Ireland this would now involve
regarding the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a
poll as being part of Parliament for this purpose; while with regard to
the withdrawal of Britain from the European Community this argument
would involve regarding the governments or possibly the legislatures
of the other member states as forming part of Parliament for this pur-
pose. Apart from the fact that aliens are disqualified from member-
ship of either House, it is the law and custom of Parliament that all
the elements composing the Houses of Parliament must be summoned
to Westminster in the appropriate manner to deliberate and vote.
Another line of argument has gained popularity in the last few
years, largely through the forceful advocacy of D. V. Cowen 65 at the
time of the Cape Coloured Voters' case" in South Africa. He was
writing about the South African Parliament to the effect that, although
South Africa had become an independent sovereign state in interna-
tional law, its Parliament remained bound by the entrenched sections
of the constitution which created the Parliament.6 7 Cowen explained
this position by saying that the definition of "Parliament" for the pur-
pose of repealing or amending the entrenched sections (two-thirds of
the members of both Houses sitting together) was different from the
definition of "Parliament" for the ordinary purposes of legislation. He
expressly stated more than once that he did not claim that his argument
applied to the United Kingdom Parliament. His readers have evidently
failed to notice that the redefinition Cowen was writing about was con-
63. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 63.
64. I. JENNINGS, CONsTrIunoNAL LAWS OF THE COmmONWEALTH 124-25 (Oxford
ed. 1957); R. HEuSTON, ESSAYS IN CONSITrrtrroNAL LAw 29 (2nd ed.).
65. D. COWEN, PARL mENTARY SovERiGmNTY AND THE ENTRENCHED SEC-IoNs OF
THE SOUTH ARIUCA ACT (1957).
66. Harris v. Minister of the Interior, [19521 2 S. Afr. L.R. 428, sub nom. Harris
v. D3nges, [1952] T.L.R. 1245.
67. South Africa Act of 1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 9.
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tained in a higher law which created the South African Parliament it-
self. The Cape Coloured Voters' case was not concerned with self-
limitation by the legislature.
The question used to be much canvassed in British law schools,
whether Parliament had bound itself by section 4 of the Statute of
Westminster 1931, which gave legal recognition to the conventional
legislative autonomy of the "dominions" therein named, which now
comprise Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This section provides
that: "No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the
commencement of this Act shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to
a Dominion as part of the law of that Dominion, unless it is expressly
declared in that Act that that Dominion has requested, and consented
to, the enactment thereof."68 Parliament did not say that it would not,
still less that it could not, pass any law relating to a dominion without
its request and consent (or, rather, unless such request and consent
were expressly declared in such act). The absurdity of regarding the
government of the dominion concerned (and, in the case of Aus-
tralia, its Parliament also) as forming part of the Unitcd Kingdom Par-
liament for this purpose has been pointed out above. As the words
we have put in italics show, the statute did not refer to the law in the
United Kingdom, but the courts are instructed to interpret future acts
of the United Kingdom Parliament as not being intended to change the
law in the dominions unless the contrary is recited in a certain way.
Lord Denning, M. R. uttered an obiter dictum in Blackburn v.
Attorney-General,69 which has naturally received a good deal of atten-
tion in academic circles, to the effect that neither the Statute of West-
minster nor the various independence acts could be reversed, but less
attention has been paid to the dictum of Salmon, L. J. in the same case
(which concerned membership of the European Community): "As to
Parliament, in the present state of the law, it can enact, amend and
repeal any legislation it pleases." 70 Somewhat different considerations
arise in relation to independence acts71 because they expressly cover
executive responsibility as well as legislative autonomy, and where
Parliament purports to transfer to a given territory all the executive
powers of the Crown as well as the legislative powers of the Crown
in Parliament in relation thereto, intending to make the transferee terri-
tory a sovereign state in international law, it is difficult to see how Par-
68. 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 4.
69. 10 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 784; [19711 1 W.L.R. 1037 (C.A.).
70. Id. at 791; 1 W.L.R. at 1041.
71. E.g., Ceylon Independence Act 1947, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 7.
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liament could change the law in the new state. With regard to the law
in the United Kingdom it is the practice for Parliament in an indepen-
dence act to make special provision for the modification of statute law
in the United Kingdom, for example, the British Nationality Acts,
Citizenship and Visiting Forces Acts.
72
It is sometimes said that Parliament has bound itself by the Parlia-
ment Acts 191173 and 1949,4 which provide that, subject to certain
exceptions and in accordance with certain procedures and time limits,
a bill may become law on receiving the royal assent although the Lords
have not consented to it. But Parliament has not bound itself by these
procedures: they are effective if employed in the prescribed manner,
but they are permissive only and alternative to the customary proce-
dures, for the Commons do not have to operate them if they do not
wish to do so. Nor did these acts alter the composition of Parliament
for any purpose: the Lords may not be bypassed, but all bills must
still by the law and custom of Parliament be presented to the House
of Lords before the question of using the Parliament Act procedures
arises. In any event these acts do not "bind" Parliament, because they
can be repealed or amended at any time by the ordinary legislative
procedure. A special enacting formula is prescribed by the Parliament
Acts for statutes passed thereunder, which must declare that the special
procedures have been complied with, thus indicating that the Queen and
the Commons are not themselves Parliament but are acting (as it were)
as delegates of the full Parliament.70 It is questionable whether the
express and vital exception of bills to extend the life of Parliament be-
yond five years can be repealed or amended without the consent of
the Lords.-"
Nor is it correct to say that Parliament has bound itself by the
Regency Acts 1937-53,7 which provide that if the Sovereign is under
eighteen years of age the royal functions shall be exercised by a
regent, who may assent to bills except bills to alter the succession to
the throne or to repeal the acts securing the established Scottish
72. E.g., Bahamas Independence Act 1973, c. 27, §§ 2-4.
73. 1 &2 Geo. 5, c. 13,§§ 1 & 2.
74. 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 103, § 1.
75. See Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 1954 C~mB. LU. 172.
76. Quaere whether the "Parliament Act 1949," purporting to reduce the "delaying
power" of the Lords and passed without their consent, has the nature of an act of Par-
liament. See 0. HooD PmLLIPS, REFORM OF THE CONSrruION 1819, 50, 89, 91-93
(1970); CoNsTrruTIONAL AND ADMINSmTAVE LAW 74, 113 (5th ed. 1973).
77. 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 16; 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 1. The Regency Acts have never
in fact come into operation.
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church. The regent and the two Houses can not repeal those excep-
tions, not because Parliament has bound its successors but because
legislation passed with the assent of the regent would be a kind of
delegated legislation. The Regency Acts are valid and effective so
long as they remain unrepealed; but this does not mean that Parliament
has bound itself, because the two Houses with the Sovereign's assent
could repeal or amend them.
There was no legal limit to the duration of a Parliament before
the Revolution. The Parliament Act ("Triennial Act") 1694 provided:
"That from henceforth no Parliament whatsoever that shall at any time
hereafter be called assembled or held shall have any continuance
longer than three years only at the farthest. ' 78  Nevertheless at the
time of the Jacobite rising Parliament enacted in the Septennial Act
1715: "That this present Parliament and all Parliaments that shall at
any time hereafter be called assembled or held shall and may have con-
tinuance for seven years, and no longer. . ." unless sooner dissolved
by the Crown. Whether one adopted the "manner and form" or the
"composition" or the "redefinition" argument, one would conclude that
Parliament was bound by the Triennial Act of 1694, that it had no
power either to prolong its own life or to extend that of subsequent
Parliaments, and that the Parliament which passed the Septennial Act
ceased to exist at the end of three years. The extraordinary exer-
cise of legislative power in 1715 did in fact arouse speeches of opposi-
tion in the Commons, a signed protest from a number of dissentient
peers, and political controversy outside Parliament that continued for
many years. It was argued in the Peers' protest that (inter alia) the
House of Commons must be chosen by the people, and that when so
chosen they are the representatives of the people, which they cannot
properly be said to be when continued for a longer time than that
for which they were chosen; and that reasons as strong or stronger than
those given for passing the bill might be found for continuing the exist-
ing Parliament still longer, or even for perpetuating it. Objections of
this kind could not be raised if the Act of 1694 had merely been re-
pealed, leaving the prerogative and (later) conventions relating to
dissolution, or if the maximum life of Parliament had been reduced to
(say) two years, and there would be less room for objection if the ex-
tension to seven years had not been applied to the existing Parliament.
The Septennial Act was amended by the Parliament Act 1911, section
78. 6&7W.&M.,c.2&3.
79. 1 Geo. 1, c. 38, § 2. See C. ROBERTSON, SELEcT STATUES, CASES AND Docu-
MnTs 200-03 (6th ed. 1935).
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7, 10 which reduced the maximum life of Parliament to five years; but
during both world wars Parliament extended its own life until after the
end of hostilities, although it adopted the self-denying practice of doing
so by annual acts."'
Composition of the Legislature
Parliament can and does alter its own composition from time to
time. A series of Representation of the People Acts from 1832 on-
wards, Redistribution of Seats Acts and other acts have extended the
qualification for membership of the House of Commons, admitted
roman catholics, changed the number and distribution of seats and the
size and shape of electoral boundaries. The provisions for independ-
ent boundary commissions could be abrogated by act of Parliament.
The composition of the House of Lords has been altered by provision
for the creation of life peers and enabling life peeresses to sit,8 2
extending the qualification of peers of Scotland beyond that prescribed
by the Union with Scotland Act, and allowing hereditary peers to re-
nounce their titles and be eligible for election to the Commons.83 Par-
liament has altered and settled the succession to the throne, and thus
the composition of Parliament. 4 In the classification of the legislative
process into matters of substance (subject-matter) and matters of pro-
cedure, it is submitted that changes in the composition of the legislature
fall under the heading of matters of substance. Parliament by such
measures as those indicated does not limit its powers for the future:
it modifies the elements that go to compose Parliament. The question
of Parliament "binding itself" or self-limitation is beside the point here.
This is one of our main contentions against the argument of Geoffrey
Marshall and those who agree with him, for Marshall somewhat off-
handedly classifies measures affecting the composition or structure of
the legislature under the heading of "forms and procedures."8' 5
III Self-limitation Implies "Higher Law"
The three specific questions raised in this article involve the
80. A Lords' amendment designed to balance the enlargement of power of the
Commons, and somewhat casually agreed to by the Commons.
81. E.g., Parliament and Local Elections Act of 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 44; Pro-
longation of Parliament Act 1941, 4 & 5 Geo. 6, c. 48.
82. Life Peerages Act of 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 21, § 1.
83. Peerage Act 1963, c. 48, §§ 1-6.
84. Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (1700); Succession to the Crown Act
of 1707, 6 Anne, c. 41; His Majesty's Declaration of Abdication Act of 1936, 1 Edw.
8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 3.
85. See MAnSHALL supra note 24, at 42.
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problem of self-referring statements. The logical objection to reflexive
propositions is manifested in law by the impracticability of self-limita-
tion by a legislature, unless it is empowered, expressly or impliedly,
to do so by some "higher law."8' 6 This principle applies to both legisla-
tive procedure and subject-matter. If the courts recognised any limita-
tions on the power of the United Kingdom Parliament to pass statutes
applicable within the United Kingdom which are expressly inconsistent
with Community law, or to repeal the European Communities Act alto-
gether, or to alter the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United
Kingdom without the consent of the majority of the people of Northern
Ireland voting at a poll, or to abridge a hypothetical statutory declara-
tion of individual rights, there must be some juridical reason for the
courts so deciding. In British constitutional law what could such a
reason be? Three possible higher laws may be suggested: (a) a
written constitution with entrenched provisions, (b) international law,
or (c) some kind of natural law. Otherwise where the courts are faced
with two inconsistent acts of Parliament and are unable to reconcile
them by applying reasonable principles of interpretation, they will
apply the maxim leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant
8 7
With regard to a written constitution with entrenched provi-
sions, if such existed it would be capable of covering all three questions
relating to the Common Market, Northern Ireland and a new declara-
tion of individual rights. With regard to (b) if British courts recog-
nised international law as being superior to municipal (national or
domestic) law, this might cover the question of the Common Market,
and perhaps also a declaration of rights in so far as the declared rights
coincided with those contained in the European Convention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. With regard to (c) recognition
by the courts of a higher natural law might cover the matter of a declara-
ration of rights.
Entrenched Constitutional Provisions?
No authority is needed for saying that there is no written British
constitution, with or without entrenched provisions, although of course
the constitution is partly enacted by Parliament itself, the enacted parts
presupposing a great deal of common law and constitutional conven-
86. See Ross, On Self-Reference and a Puzzle in Constitutional Law, 78 MIND 1;
H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 124-28 (1945).
87. "Later laws abrogate prior laws that are contrary to them." 2 E. COKE, INSTI-
TUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 685; [1842] 5 Beav. 574.
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tion. 88 There is a possibility that Parliament is theoretically bound by
certain provisions of the Union with Scotland Act 170689 and the cor-
responding statute passed by the Scottish Parliament, because those
acts created the Parliament of Great Britain, that is, England and Wales
with Scotland. The relevant provisions-relating to the existence of
the Union itself, the maintenance of the established (presbyterian)
Church of Scotland, a vague restriction on the alteration of Scots private
law, and the preservation of the superior Scottish courts-are not
directly in point; but Parliament has more than once infringed some
of these "entrenched" provisions. Thus lay patronage was restored in
the Church of Scotland in 1711,90 and the requirement that professors
at Scottish universities should subscribe to the Confession of Faith was
removed in 1853.01 However that may be, Lord Cooper said obiter
in the Scottish case of MacCormick v. Lord Advocate9 2 that he doubted
whether in any event the court would have jurisdiction to review
governmental acts purporting to be authorized by an act of Parliament
which was repugnant to the Treaty of Union. 3 Itis even more doubtful
whether an English court, or the House of Lords as the final appeal
court in all but Scottish criminal cases, would hold Parliament to be
bound by these provisions. It was implicitly accepted that the Parlia-
ment of Great Britain could merge the Union into a wider Union with
Ireland."
Primacy of International Law?
There is ample judicial authority for saying that general interna-
tional law does not take priority in the United Kingdom over acts of
Parliament. The common law has not adopted a theory of a monistic
world legal order involving the supremacy of international law over the
various state legal systems. 3 In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home
88. See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra.
89. 6 Anne, c. 11.
90. Church Patronage Act, 10 Anne, c. 21 (Scot.).
91. Universities Act, 16 & 17 Viet., c. 89 (Scot).
92. [1953] Sess. Cas. 396; [1953] Scots. L.T.R. 255.
93. Scots lawyers tend to refer to the "Treaty" of Union between Scotland and Eng-
land which was later ratified by the Union with Scotland Act of 1706, 6 Anne, c. 11
and the Union with England Act of 1706, c. 7 (A.P.S. XI, 406).
94. See Union with Ireland Act of 1800, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67.
95. See H. KELsEN, Thn PURE THEORY oF LAw ch. 7 (2d ed. Knight transl. 1967).
But see H. Hart, Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law, EThrcs AND SocIL JUSTICE,
4 CoNT. Pnm. TaoUHT 171, 188-90.
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Department, Ex parte Thakrar96 Lord Denning, M.R., cited with
approval the dictum of Lord Atkin in Chung Chi Cheung v. The King9"
that a rule of international law cannot be treated as incorporated into
English municipal law when to do so would be inconsistent with the
provisions of a statute. Thus it was held in Thakrar's case that, even
if the applicant were still a British protected person, he could not in-
yoke a right under any rule of international law which placed on one
state a duty to receive any of its nationals expelled by another state,
for such rule was inconsistent with the Immigration Act 1 9 7 1es under
which Thakrar was a "nonpatrial" and required a license to enter the
United Kingdom. In Mortensen v. Peters99 the Danish captain of a
Norwegian ship was convicted of infringing the Herring Fishery (Scot-
land) Act 1889,100 which forbade trawling in the Moray Firth, although
the acts done were outside the three-mile limit which was at that time
accepted as the limit of territorial waters under international law. The
lord justice (Lord Dunedin) said:
In this Court we have nothing to do with the question of whether
the legislature has or has not done what foreign powers may con-
sider a usurpation in a question with them. Neither are we a tri-
bunal sitting to decide whether an act of the legislature is ultra
vires as in contravention of generally acknowledged principles of
international law. For us an Act of Parliament duly passed by
Lords and Commons and assented to by the King, is supreme, and
we are bound to give effect to its terms ...
It is a trite observation that there is no such thing as a stand-
ard of International Law, extraneous to the domestic law of a king-
dom, to which appeal may be made. International Law so far,
as this Court is concerned, is the body of doctrine regarding
the international rights and duties of States which has been adopted
and made part of the Law of Scotland ...
[I]t can at least be clearly said that the appellant cannot
make out his proposition that it is inconceivable that the British
legislature should attempt for fishery regulation to legislate against
all and sundry in such a place. And if that is so, then I revert -to
the considerations already stated which as a matter of construction
make me think that it did so legislate.10'
In Theophile v. Solicitor-GeneraP'2 Lord Porter said that where
a statute was clear and unambiguous the "comity of nations" was irrele-
96. [1974] Q.B. 684 (C.A.).
97. [1939] A.C. 160, 167-68 (P.C. 1938).
98. C. 77.
99. 14 Scots L.T.R. 227 (Scot. Ct. Justiciary) (1906). The financial control and
the crew of the ship were in fact British.
100. 52 & 53 Viet., c. 23, § 7(1).
101. 14 Scots L.T.R. at 230-31.
102. [1950] A.C. 186, 195.
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vant. There is a presumption of interpretation, but only a presump-
tion, that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary to the
principles of international law which have been recognized or adopted
by the domestic law.103
The making of treaties is regarded by British constitutional law
as an entirely executive act, and the treaty-making function lies within
the prerogative (common law) powers of the Crown. Treaties as such
do not require the approval of Parliament in order that the state (the
Crown) may be bound by them in international law, 10 4 though they
may be made expressly subject to parliamentary approval. On the
other hand, the internal law cannot be altered by the making of a treaty
because, as was declared in the Case of Proclamations'0 5 and in the
Bill of Rights,0 6 the Monarch cannot make law for the realm without
Parliament. Thus in Cheney v. Conn, Ungoed-Thomas J., said:
First, International Law is part of -the law of the land, but it
yields to statute. . . . Secondly, conventions which are ratified by
an Act of Parliament are part of the law of the land. And, thirdly,
conventions which are ratified but not by an Act of Parliament,
which thereby gives them statutory force, cannot prevail against a
statute in unambiguous terms.1°7
He therefore held that, even if there were a conflict between the
Geneva Conventions Act 1957,108 implementing the conventions con-
cerning the construction of nuclear weapons, and the Finance Act
1964109 under which the appellant was taxed (which there was not),
103. See Mortensen v. Peters 14 Scots L.T.R. 227 (Scot. Justiciary) (1906);
The Zamora [1916] A.C. 77 (P.C.); Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians
v. Attorney-General for Canada [1947] A.C. 87 (P.C. 1946); see also The Queen v.
Keyn 2 Ex. D. 63 (The Franconia) (1876) holding Central Criminal Court had no
jurisdiction to try foreigner, the captain of foreign ship bound for foreign port, for man-
slaughter occurring within three miles of the British coast. This case led to the passage
of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act of 1878, 41 & 42 Viet., c. 73 extending juris-
diction of British courts over all acts by whomever committed within the three mile
limit.
104. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario [1937] A.C.
326 (P.C.). It is the practice for Heads-of-State treaties to be laid before both Houses
for 21 days before ratification by the Crown.
105. 12 Co. Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (1611). "mhe King by his proclama-
tion cannot create any offence which not an offence before, for then he may alter
the law of the land by his proclamation ..... [A]Iso the law of England is divided into
three parts, common law, statute law, and custom; but the King's proclamation is none
of them."
106. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
107. [1968] 1 W.L.R. 242, 245.
108. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 52.
109. C. 49.
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the Finance Act prevailed over the international conventions. Lord
Denning in Blackburn v. Attorney-General said:
Even if a treaty is signed, it is elementary that these courts
take no notice of treaties as such. We take no notice of treaties
until they are embodied in laws enacted by Parliament, and then
only to the extent that Parliament tells us." 0
Similarly, in McWhirter v. Attorney-General"' his Lordship said
that the courts did not let treaties signed by the Crown impinge on the
rights or liberties of any man unless and until they were incorporated
into the law by act of Parliament. Diplock, L.J., went so far as to
say in Salomon v. Customs and Excise Commissioners"12 that the
sovereign power of Parliament extended to the breaking of treaties.
Therefore if it is required to alter the general law of the land in any
way, or to affect private rights or to impose any form of taxation, this
can only be done by act of Parliament. 1 3 On all grounds-alteration
of the general law, modification of the rights and obligations of indiv-
iduals and the variation of fiscal arrangements-the passing of the
European Communities Act was constitutionally necessary to imple-
ment accession to the Community Treaties.
Natural Law?
Doctrines of natural law have persisted among European thinkers
in one form or another for well over two thousand years, though the
content of natural law has been vague and variable. As a moral or
theological theory it is entitled to the greatest respect, but there is no
authority for saying that the United Kingdom Parliament is bound by
natural law in any form." 4 Obiter dicta uttered in the seventeenth
century by Coke, C. J., and Hobart, C. I., and reported by themselves,"'
arose out of special sets of circumstances concerning the privileges of
corporations under royal charters confirmed by statute. The dicta can
be explained as expressing a presumption of interpretation that Parlia-
ment does not intend to confer jurisdiction on a corporation or its offi-
110. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037, 1039; see also Rustomjee v. The Queen, 2 Q.B.D. 69,
74 (1876) (per Lord Coleridge, CJ.).
111. 11 COMM. MKr. L.R. 882 (1972) (English Court of Appeals).
112. 11967] 2 Q.B. 116 (1966).
113. See LoaD McNAui, THE LAw OF TREATMS, ch. 2.
114. See generally J. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY (1955); R. POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUARANTEES Ov LmrttTY (1957).
115. Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610);
Day v. Savadge, Hobart 85, 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (1615). But cf. Lee v. Bude and
Torrington Junction Railway Co., L.R. 6 C.P. 576, 582 (per Willes, J.) and 4 E. COKE,
INsTTrUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 36.
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cer to decide its own legal rights in disputes between the corporation
and other persons. Blackstone explains1 16 that if Parliament gave a
man power to try all causes arising in his manor, the courts would con-
strue this as not intending to extend to causes in which he himself is
a party; but if Parliament should clearly and expressly enact that he
might try his own causes as well as those of other persons, no court
would have power to defeat the intent of the legislature. In modern
times we have the statement of Lord Wright in Liversidge v. Anderson:
Parliament is supreme. It can enact extraordinary powers
of interfering with personal liberty. If an Act of Parliament...
is alleged to limit or curtail the liberty of the subject. . . the only
question is what is the precise extent of the powers given. 117
More recently in the tersely reported case of R. v. Jordan,"8 in
which the leader of the British movement contended that the Race Re-
lations Act 1968,"19 under which he had been sentenced to imprison-
ment, was invalid as being in curtailment of free slgech, the divisional
court said that Parliament was supreme, there was no power in the
courts to question the validity of an act of Parliament, and the ground
of the application was completely unarguable.
IV The European Community
The signing of the treaty of accession to the Community was, as
has been said, an executive act. The European Communities Act
1972 120 provides by section 2(1) that "enforceable Community rights,"
which in accordance with the treaties are without further enactment
to be given legal effect or used in the United Kingdom, shall be recog-
nized and available in law, and be enforced accordingly. Such rights
and obligations are those created by the treaties themselves, and also
by existing and future regulations which take effect directly as law in
the member states. Section 2(2) confers power by statutory instru-
ment to implement in the United Kingdom existing or future Commu-
nity laws that are not directly applicable, including Community direc-
tives addressed to the member states which are binding as to the result
to be achieved while leaving to member states the form in which they
shall be implemented. Certain limitations on such delegated legisla-
tion are set out in schedule 2, viz., it may not impose taxation, have
116. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMrmNTARiES 91.
117. [1942] A.C. 206,260-61 (1941).
118. 1967 ClaM. L. REv. 483.
119. C. 71.
120. C. 68.
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retroactive effect, sub-delegate legislative power, or create new crim-
inal offences punishable by more than two years' imprisonment or a
fine of £400. Section 2(4) is designed to obviate conflict between fu-
ture United Kingdom legislation and Community law. It provides that
power to implement Community directives by delegated legislation in-
eludes power to amend acts of Parliament, and that existing and future
enactments are to be construed subject to this section (including the
enforceability of Community rights); but the limitations prescribed by
schedule 2 are to continue unless repealed by any future act. Section
3 provides that in any legal proceedings any question as to the inter-
pretation of the treaties or Community instruments shall be treated as
a question of law and, if not referred to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities,' 21 shall be determined in accordance with the
principles laid down by, and any relevant decision of, that court. Part
II of the act, with schedules 3 and 4, contains detailed legislation
needed on, or shortly after, accession in order to implement treaty ob-
ligations, notably amendments to company law.
Two proceedings were brought in the English courts before the
European Communities Act was passed, one before the treaty was
signed and one after it was signed. In Blackburn v. Attorney-Gen-
eral22 Blackburn claimed declarations to the effect that, by signing the
treaty, the government would irreversibly surrender in part the sover-
eignty of the Crown in Parliament, and in so doing would be acting
in breach of the law. Lord Denning, M.R., said that, in the first place,
no treaty had yet been signed, even if a treaty were signed the courts
could take no notice of it until it was embodied in an act of parliament
and even if this treaty was in a category by itself the same principle
applied. Secondly, his Lordship said:
If Her Majesty's Ministers sign this treaty and Parliament en-
acts provisions to implement it, I do not envisage that Parliament
would afterwards go back on it and try to withdraw from it. But,
if Parliament should do so, then I say we will consider that event
when it happens. We will then say whether Parliament can law-
fully do it or not.123
Lord Denning has a penchant for speculative dicta which please
the academics more than the practitioners. As the matter of legislation
was at that time hypothetical it was not necessary to deal with Black-
121. For reference to the European Court from British courts, see Bulmer v. Bol-
linger, [1974] ch. 401; Van Duyn v. Home Office, [19741 1 W.L.R. 1107.
122. .[1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037, 1040 (C.A.).
123. Id. at 1040.
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burn's argument about Parliament, as Stamp, L.J., pointed out. 2 4  It
was held that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of
action and should be struck out. In the other case, McWhirter v. At-
torney-General,25 McWhirter sought a declaration that the signing of
the treaty of accession was unlawful because it was in conflict with
the Bill of Rights which vested in William and Mary "the entire perfect
and full exercise of the regall power and government . . . ." The Court
of Appeal upheld the master's order that the summons be struck out as
not disclosing any reasonable cause of action, but although McWhirter's
locus standi was doubtful they were not prepared to say that it was friv-
olous and vexatious.
The implementation of the treaties by section 2 of the European
Communities Act does not necessitate a restatement of the funda-
mental principles of British constitutional law, although it has set before
both Houses of Parliament the difficult problem of devising adequate
methods for supervising Community secondary legislation, as well as
British delegated legislation implementating Community directives, be-
fore it is too late to criticize and influence the policy behind it. The
strictly constitutional position appears to be that Parliament could repeal
or unilaterally amend the European Communities Act. If this were done
without the agreement of all the other members of the Community for
good cause, however, it would in international law (as well as European
Community law) involve a breach of treaty on the part of the United
Kingdom. Actual renunciation of the treaty would be a matter for
the government. With regard to repeal of the act, what we have said
is in accordance with the advice given to both the Conservative and
Labour governments before accession to the Community by four suc-
cessive lord chancellors in their capacity as the chief legal and consti-
tutional advisers to the government.'26
With regard to conflicts between British municipal law and Com-
munity law, the effect of the European Communities Act is that an ear-
lier domestic law gives way to a later Community law, whether such
laws were made before or after the act came into force. As between
an earlier Community law and a later act of parliament, the British
courts would no doubt interpret the later act so far as reasonably possi-
124. Id. at 1041.
125. 11 COMM. Mrr. L.R. 882 (1972) (English Court of Appeals).
126. See 0. HOOD PHELrs, supra note 38 at 64-65. Namely, Lord Kilmuir and
Lord Dilhorne to Mr. Macmillan's Conservative government, Lord Gardiner to Mr. Wil-
son's Labour government, and Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone to Mr. Heath's Conserv-
ative government.
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ble in such a way as not to conflict with the community law. Implicit
conflicts of this kind would surely be inadvertent on the part of drafts-
men and legislators, and they would presumably be corrected by
amending legislation. It is submitted, however, that if a later act of
Parliament were clearly and expressly inconsistent with an earlier Com-
munity law, a British court would regard itself as bound to apply the
later act.'2 7
From the point of view of the European Court the matter looks
different. In the leading case of Costa v. ENEL 128 an Italian court
asked the European Court in accordance with article 177 of the treaty
(whereby the courts of member states may, and in some cases must, ask
the European Court to interpret Community laws) whether an Italian
post-treaty law nationalising the electricity power industry was com-
patible with the provisions of the treaty. It was not within the compe-
tence of the European Court to rule on the relation between Commu-
nity law and national law, but in the course of exercising its function
of interpreting the relevant provisions of Community law the court
stated its opinion on certain general principles:
As opposed to other international treaties, the Treaty instituting
-the E.E.C. has created its own order which was integrated with
the national order of the member-States -the moment the Treaty came
into force; as such, it is binding upon them. In fact, by creating
a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its
own personality and its own capacity in law, apart from having in-
ternational standing and more particularly, real powers resulting
from a limitation of competence or a transfer of powers from the
States to the Community, the member-States, albeit within limited
spheres, have restricted their sovereign rights and created a body
of law applicable both to their nationals and to themselves. The
reception, within the laws of each member-State, of provisions hav-
ing a Community source, and more particularly of the terms and of
the spirit of -the Treaty, has as a corollary the impossibility, for the
member-States, to give preference to a unilateral and subsequent
measure against a legal order accepted by them on a basis of reci-
procity.
The transfer, by member-States, from their national order,
in favour of the Community order of the rights and obligations
arising from the Treaty, carries with it a clear limitation of their
sovereign right upon which a subsequent unilateral law, incompati-
ble with the aims of the Community, cannot prevail. As a conse-
127. See Howe, The European Communities Act 1972, 49 INT'L A- FAms 1 (1973)
(the author was the minister chiefly responsible for drafting the bill and piloting it
through the Commons); Forman, The European Communities Act 1972, 10 Comm.
MKT. L. R. 39 (1973) (the author was employed as a solicitor by the Commission
of the European Communities).
128. COMM. MKT. L.R. 425 (1964) (Italian Corte Constituzionale).
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quence, Article 177 should be applied regardless of any national
law in those cases where a question of the interpretation of the
Treaty arises.' 29
Now the European Court merely interprets Community laws; it
cannot, and does not purport to, decide cases in national courts. The
Italian legal system may accept the principle propounded in Costa v.
ENEL as applicable within that country; but so far as the United King-
dom is concerned, the Crown could not bring about such an effect
within the United Kingdom by acceding to the treaty, and with regard
to Parliament we are back to the constitutional problem of self-limita-
tion. As the European Communities Act makes opinions of the Eu-
ropean Court binding on British courts, there appears to be a kind of
renvoi, but ultimately within the United Kingdom its constitutional law
must prevail.
In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case' 30 the question be-
fore a German administrative court was whether a Community agricul-
tural regulation prescribing a deposit system for exports was invalid on
the ground that it violated certain basic rights guaranteed by the Ger-
man Federal Constitution. The European Court was asked to inter-
pret the relevant regulation, and in upholding it said:
[T]he validity of a Community instrument or its effect within a
member-State cannot be affected by allegations that it strikes at
either the fundamental rights as formulated in that State's consti-
tution or the principles of a national constitutional structure.
An examination should however be made as to whether some
analogous guarantee, inherent in Community law, has not been
infringed. For respect for fundamental rights has an integral part
in the general principles of law of which the Court of Justice
ensures respect. The protection of such rights, while inspired by
-the constitutional principles common to the member-States must be
ensured within the framework of the Community's structure and
objectives. We should therefore examine in the light of the doubts
expressed by the Administrative Court whether the deposit system
did infringe fundamental rights respect for which must be ensured
in the Community legal order. 131
Community lawyers, notably Gerhard Bebr,132 Mitchell 3  and
129. Id. at 455-56.
130. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Fiar
Getrade und Futtermittel, 11 Comm. MKT. LR. 255 (1970) (European Court of Jus-
tice).
131. Id. at 283. The German court did not accept the ruling of the European Court
but referred the matter to the Federal Constitutional Court, who decided by 4-3 that
they were competent to rule on the application of Community Law in relation to the
Federal Constitution. There the matter rests as of the time of this writing.
132. Bebr, Law of the European Communities and Municipal Law, 34 Modem L.
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Dagtoglou,13 4 have adopted this theory that Community law is a new
kind of legal order. This new legal order is regarded as being autono-
mous and distinct from either international law or constitutional law.
Mitchell rhapsodies about the "revolution" which the British Govern-
ment has joined its fellow governments in bringing about. He also
draws a parallel with the new legal order established in 1707. But the
Treaty and Acts of Union of 1707 created the Parliament of Great Brit-
ain; the Parliament of the United Kingdom has not been created by
the Treaty of Brussels. In more sober language Mitchell's view is that
this new legal order is binding on the United Kingdom unless it re-
nounces the treaty. But "binding" only has meaning in relation to a
given system of norms. What may be regarded as binding in Commu-
nity law is not necessarily binding in constitutional law. Two different
legal orders are under discussion, with different foundations. The pri-
ority of Community laws over the content of national law, whatever may
be the scope in which that priority operates, was created by, and con-
tinues at the will of, Parliament. Thus Lord Diplock has said extra-
judicially:
If the Queen in Parliament were to make laws which were in
conflict with this country's obligations under -the Treaty of Rome,
those laws and not the conflicting provisions of the Treaty would
be given effect to as the domestic law of the United Kingdom.13 5
And Lord Justice Scarman, also extra-judicially, has written:
The European Communities Act preserves, of course, the de jure
sovereignty of Parliament. Community law has the force of law
because Parliament says so.
... [C]onflicts between Community law and home-made law
should be few.
Nevertheless, they will arise one day . I.. t is likely to
take the form of a conflict between a Community rule of law and a
Rev. 481 (1971). The author, legal adviser to the European Commission, reviews de-
cisions of the European Court down to 1971.
133. Mitchell, Kuipers and Gall, Constitutional Aspects of the Treaty and Legisla-
tion Relating to British Membership, 9 COMm. MKT. L.R. 134 (1972). Mitchell
is Salvesen Professor of European Institutions at Edinburgh University. A more polem-
ical discussion will be found in Mitchell, Constitutional Law, TEN AND Now 1799-1974
(London 1974) 100-04.
134. Dagtoglou, European Communities and Constitutional Law, [1973] Ct"IB. LJ.
256. Dagtoglou points out certain limiting factors, including the limited jurisdiction of
the Community and its institutions; the practice of the unanimity principle by the Coun-
cil and its committees in all but technical matters, the (non-judicial) control of the
commission by the national executives and not by the European Parliament, and the
modification of the treaties by new treaties rather than according to the procedure pro-
vided therein.
135. Diplock, The Common Market and the Common Law, 6 J.A.L.T. 3, 5 (1972).
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subsequently enacted statute .... The European Communities
Act cannot be read as limiting the sovereignty of Parliament.
No British court could, I suggest, go so far as to hold that Parlia-
ment to-day had limited the freedom of action of Parliament to-
morrow without a constitutional reform that is in fact beyond the
power of Parliament by statute to effect.13 6
Even if the system of Community law be regarded among the
member states as a new kind of legal order creating obligations differ-
ent from those arising from ordinary treaties, yet the act of joining the
Community is itself an act of state in international law. "No doubt
the treaty is important," as Phillimore, L.J., said in McWhirter v. At-
torney-General, 3 7 in forming part of international law . . . ." Com-
munity law, if a new kind of legal order, is based on international law.
The member-states are bound according to the rules of the system while
they remain members. With regard to the power of Parliament to re-
peal the European Communities Act or to pass other legislation ex-
pressly inconsistent with Community law, we have submitted that it is
one aspect of the impracticability of self-limitation. A cardinal differ-
ence between the European Communities Act and the Statute of West-
minster or Independence Act is that the European Communities Act
directly affects the law in the United Kingdom. With regard to any
attempt by one Parliament to tie the hands of a later Parliament as to
membership or non-membership of the Community by requiring a ref-
erendum or some special majority in Parliament, such matters would be
matters of procedure with which British courts would not concern
themselves. This view is in accordance with the constitutional and po-
litical history of the country, for it is difficult to imagine a British court
declaring as invalid, or declining to apply, an act of Parliament passed
at the instance of (say) an existing Labour government because of
some attempt under a previous Conservative government (or vice
versa) to prevent or obstruct the passing of such an act.
V Status of Northern Ireland
The declaration in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973138
has been preserved by section 2(7) of the Northern Ireland Act
136. Scarman, The Lew of Establishment in the European Economic Community,
24 N. IRE. LEGAL Q. 61, 70-72 (1973); see also Trindade, Parliamentary Sovereignty
and the Primacy of European Community Law, 35 MODERN L. REv. 375 (1972); D.
LASoK AND J. BRMGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTrr oNS oF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNmES 226-29 (London 1973).
137. 11 COMM. MaT. L.R. 882, 887 (1972).
138. C. 36, § 1. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
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1974,119 which provided for the dissolution of the Northern Ireland As-
sembly and the holding of a constitutional convention. So we have
the declaration in the Ireland Act 1949140 that the status of Northern
Ireland as part of the United Kingdom would not be changed without
the consent of the Parliament of Northern Ireland; the confirmation of
this by the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972,'
which suspended the Northern Ireland Parliament; the alteration of this
arrangement by the substitution of a referendum under the Northern
Ireland Constitution Act 1973 which abolished the Northern Ireland
Parliament and replaced it by an Assembly; and now the Northern Ire-
land Act 1974, mentioned above, which preserves the referendum for
altering the United Kingdom status. The declaration in the 1973 act
indicates that the United Kingdom Parliament was not bound by the
Act of 1949 as regards the "manner and form" or "forms and proce-
dures" required for acts altering the status of Northern Ireland; and the
confirmations declared first by the 1972 Act and then by the 1974 Act-
however reassuring morally to the majority in Northern Ireland-would
be redundant if the provisions confirmed were regarded as legally bind-
ing.
Another question is the competence in this context of the United
Kingdom Parliament if it is the creature of the union of Great Britain
with Ireland. The Union with Ireland Act 180014 2 passed by the Par-
liament of Great Britain, and the corresponding act passed by the Par-
liament of Ireland, followed parallel resolutions passed by each parlia-
ment in response to messages from the Crown; but unlike the union be-
tween England and Scotland there was no previous treaty negotiated
by commissioners representing each country.143 Further, the constitu-
tional relationship between England (later, Great Britain) and Ireland
in the centuries before the Irish union is confusing for the historian.
Generally Ireland seems to have been a subordinate kingdom of the
139. C. 28, § 2(7). "Nothing in subsections (3) to (6) above shall be construed
as authorizing the Secretary of State to direct the holding of a poll otherwise than in
accordance with Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 in relation
to the matters dealt with in section 1 of that Act (status of Northern Ireland as part
of the United Kingdom)."
140. 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 41. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
141. C. 22.
142. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67.
143. H. CALVERT, CONSITrUTIONAL LAw IN NORTHERN IRELAND 17 (London 1968)
[hereinafter cited as CALVERT]. The author contends that the Irish Union was based
on a "treaty," although forced on the unwilling Irish. Contra, E. CURTIS, HISTORY OF
IRELAND 351-53 (London 1936).
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English (British) Crown, although an act passed by the British Parlia-
ment in 1783144 enacted that:
The Right claimed by the People of Ireland to be bound only by
Laws enacted by his Majesty and the Parliament of that Kingdom,
in all Cases whatever ...shall be, and it is hereby declared to
be established and ascertained for ever, and shall, at no time
hereafter, be questioned or questionable. 45
However that may be, the Union with Ireland Act (G.B.) pro-
vided that the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland should be united
"for ever" into one kingdom, by the name of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland, and that the United Kingdom should be rep-
resented in one and the same Parliament. It further provided that the
government and doctrine of the United Church of England and Ireland
should be and remain "for ever" assimilated to those of the existing
Church of England, and that the continuance of the United Church
should be deemed "a fundamental and essential part" of the Union.
The first breach in the fundamental terms of the Union came with the
disestablishment of the Church of Ireland in 1869;46 and the Union
itself was disrupted in 1922 by the separation of the Irish Free State
with dominion status similar to that of Canada,-47 later recognized as
the independent Republic of Ireland. 14 Northern Ireland remained
within the United Kingdom with a subordinate Parliament and a meas-
ure of governmental devolution, 4 9 until these were replaced in the last
few years by the various acts mentioned above.
The grounds for arguing that the United Kingdom Parliament may
be bound by certain fundamental provisions of the acts creating the
union between England and Scotland are weaker in the case of the
Irish Union, both because of the pre-union history of Ireland and be-
cause the greater part of the Irish Union has already disappeared. In any
event it is doutbful whether even those who champion the supremacy of
the Scottish Union would claim that the courts have jurisdiction to review
acts of Parliament on this ground. One of Lord Cooper's obiter dicta
144. An Act for preventing and removing all Doubts which have arisen, or might
arise concerning the inclusive Rights of the Parliament and Courts of Ireland in matters
of Legislation and Judicature of 1783, 23 Geo. 3, c. 28.
145. Id. § 1.
146. 32 & 33 Vict., c. 42.
147. Irish Free State (Agreement) Act of 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, c. 4; Irish Free
State Constitution Act of 1922, 13 Geo. 5, sess. 2, c. 1; Irish Free State (Consequential
Provisions) Act of 1922, 13 Geo. 5, sess. 2, c. 2.
148. Ireland Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 41.
149. Government of Ireland Act of 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 67, as amended from
time to time. Northern Ireland comprises six of the counties of Ulster.
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in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate15" was a disclaimer of jurisdiction to
review matters of this kind. The probable attitude of the House of
Lords as the final appeal court in all cases except criminal appeals from
Scotland is less in doubt.
A distinguished former lord chief justice of Northern Ireland,
Lord MacDermott, recently wrote:
[A]s respects a juristically recognised region of the United King-
dom like Northern Ireland it is at least arguable that, in the
absence of duress, or consent on the part of the region concerned,
or the wish of its people to secede, the United Kingdom Parliament
has no power to alienate the allegiance or reduce the status of the
people of that region. British sovereignty [in Northern Ireland]
sits on a platform which rests firmly on a collection of treaties, acts
of conquest, Acts of Parliament and solemn undertakings that have
all been cemented together by a wide consensus: and it cannot
lightly be taken for granted that -the planks of the platform can be
removed at pleasure. 51
This is a subtle and elegant statement, and we hope we have not
been guilty of lightly taking the matter for granted. It has been sug-
gested that if a bill purported to separate Northern Ireland from the
United Kingdom without the consent of a majority of its people, this
would be "unconstitutional" and the royal assent could, and should, be
withheld;152 but this point was settled a century ago when Gladstone
overrode Queen Victoria's extreme reluctance to give her assent to the
Irish Church Bill, by reminding her that her main constitutional duty
was to act on the advice of her ministers.
VI Feasibility of a New Bill of Rights
People in Britain who in speeches and letters to the press call for
a new Bill of Rights or statutory declaration of civil liberties, but who
are unacquainted with the flexible nature of the British constitution,
are not aware of the juristic problems involved. To educated readers
in a country which has a written constitution containing a special proce-
dure for amendment and entrenched sections, the problems will seem
familiar and obvious. To most British lawyers the matter has so far
appeared to be merely "academic," which in practitioners' parlance
150. [19531 S.C. 396; [1953] S.L.T. 255.
151. MacDermott, The Decline of the Rule of Law, 23 N. I.. L.Q. 475, 494 (1972).
152. CALvERT, supra note 143. The author was a senior lecturer in law at
Queen's University, Belfast. Contra, MArrLAND, supra note 32, at 332: "We have no ir-
repealable laws; all laws may be repealed by the ordinary legislature, even the conditions
upon which the English and Scottish parliaments agreed to merge themselves in the par-
liament of Great Britain."
[Vol. 2
SELF-LIMITATION
means, not worth discussing. However, at least three holders of high
judicial office have recently advocated a statutory declaration of in-
dividual rights. Quintin Hogg, Q.C., M.P., shortly before he became
lord chancellor as Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone, published some
proposals for constitutional reform. Among his proposals were a new
Bill of Rights by which Parliament would limits its right to legislate to the
detriment of individuals or regional rights; and a provision that the ju-
diciary would have the right to adjudicate on the constitutionality of
laws, unless the constitution had been deliberately overridden in any
particular by a deliberate decree, which could not be passed without
debate. Lord Hailsham went on to say that he had changed his mind
about the traditional British view of the relative unimportance of dec-
larations of rights compared with remedies.
It is the arbitrary rule of the modern Parliament itself which
needs consideration. Every other country-including those Com-
monwealth countries-have insisted on safeguards of this kind, and
in theory we are committed to it .... Mhe European Conven-
tion-which embodies many of the same rights--is enforceable, and
we are party to it. Cannot our judiciary be entrusted with some
of the powers, which, at least in theory, we have entrusted to a
European court?' 53
This refers to the European Court of Human Rights set up under
the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms.154 The United Kingdom has accepted the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of this court, and has recognized the right of individuals to bring
petitions against her before the European Commission of Human
Rights.' 5 Lord Justice Salmon (now a lord of appeal) said in a re-
cent lecture:
I am beginning to wonder whether it would not be wise to
evolve, not an elaborate constitution, but perhaps the equivalent
of a modem Bill of Rights. A statute which should lay down our
basic freedoms, provide for their preservation and enact that it
could not be repealed save by, say, a 75% majority of both Houses
of Parliament. . .. I recognise that, in theory, it would be possi-
ble to repeal such an Act-even perhaps by a simple majority. In
practice, however, it would be exceptionally difficult for any Gov-
ernment to do so. Whilst it remained on the Statute Book, it would
afford real protection against the gradual erosion of liberty as well
as direct attack upon liberty.156
153. Q. HOGo, NEW CHARTER (1969). See also articles by Lord Hailsham in The
Times (London) May 12, 16, 19 and 20, 1975.
154. Cim. No. 8969 (1953); CMD. No. 9221 (1954).
155. CMD. No. 2894 (1966); prolonged CmD. No. 5026 (1972).
156. Lord Scarman, who was the first chairman of the English Law Commission,
in his recent Hamlyn Lectures (expected to be published in 1975) expressed the opinion
that Britain needs an entrenched Bill of Rights which would take into account her inter-
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Charles L. Black, Jr., has gone so far as to ask whether, in view
of the adoption of the European Convention, there is not already a Brit-
ish Bill of Rights. It should be noticed that the recognition of the juris-
diction of the European Court of Human Rights and of the right of in-
dividuals to petition is in practice made for short periods at a time.
Black acknowledges that adoption of the convention does not make it
part of the internal law, and suggests that Parliament could make the
convention enforceable by internal law and could prescribe a rule of
construction whereby the courts would make it override inconsistent
laws. He admits, however, that this would hold only so long as it was
not expressly repealed and that no Parliament can bind its successor.
Two model precedents exist within the commonwealth whereby
legislatures which are unable to bind themselves have attempted what
we may call quasi-entrenchment of certain provisions. One model is
provided by the unicameral Parliament of New Zealand which passed
an Electoral Act in 1956 which enacted in section 189 that certain pro-
visions relating to the life of Parliament, the franchise and secret ballot,
might not be repealed or amended except by a majority of 75% of. all
the members of the House of Representatives or by a simple majority
of votes in a referendum. Section 189 itself was not similarly pro-
tected, because it was recognized that double quasi-entrenchment
would be no more effective than the simple kind. The better opinion
appears to be that the effect of this provision, while it may impose a
moral obligation amounting to a constitutional convention, does not
constitute a legal limitation on the New Zealand Parliament. Some
New Zealand lawyers, however, think that repeal or amendment by
simple majority would require "two bites to the cherry," it being nec-
essary first to repeal section 189 (which could be done by simple ma-
jority) ;15 but there does not seem to be any point in this15 8-if nec-
essary at all, it could probably be done by two sections in the same act.
The other model is provided by Canada, whose Parliament-al-
though bicameral and federal-may be regarded in federal matters as
national and internal obligations in the human rights field, as well as her new relation-
ship with the European Economic Community and, if devolution comes about with the
various regions." The Times (London), Dec. 6, 1974, at 4, col. 5.
157. Robertson, The Reserved Provisions of the Electoral Act, 1 OTAGO L. REV. 222
(1967).
158. "Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, treats with proper contempt these restraining
clauses, which endeavour to tie up the hands of succeeding legislatures. 'When you re-
peal the law itself', says he, 'you at the same time repeal the prohibitory clause which
guards against such repeal."' 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS 90-91.
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being in a similar position to that of New Zealand for the present pur-
pose. An act passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1960 contains the
"Canadian Bill of Rights." This recognises and declares certain
enumerated rights and freedoms and, in a section of which the side
note reads "Construction of law" enacts that: "Every law of Canada
shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of Parliament of Canada
that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so
construed and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe. . . any
of the rights or freedoms herein recognised and declared." The effect
of the decision of the majority of the Supreme Court in R. v. Dry-
bones"5" seems to be that an abridgment of the declared rights
cannot be done by statutory implication, but would require express
words in an act of Parliament. This is far from constituting entrench-
ment because, not only could the Canadian Parliament expressly ex-
clude the operation of the Bill of Rights in any act, but it could by
the ordinary legislative procedure expressly repeal or amend the Bill
of Rights itself.
Opinions in Britain will differ as to whether it is desirable for the
United Kingdom to follow either the New Zealand or the Canadian
model, and (if so) which. The present writer has suggested else-
where' 0  a method by which-if this were desired-the United King-
dom could give itself a legally entranced bill of rights. The solution
is so radical, however, that it is almost certainly beyond the bounds of
practical politics at the present time. It would require nothing less than
the replacement of the existing constitution (including Parliament) by
a new (written) constitution, which would create a new legislature, and
would entrench the Declaration of Rights together with the procedure
for constitutional amendment and the power of judicial review of legis-
lation. There would have to be a breach of legal continuity between
the old constitution and the new. If the country were to go through
all this trouble, the new written constitution might as well include mem-
bership of the European Community and the status of Northern Ire-
land, together with provision for the monarchy, a second chamber, the
maximum life of the legislature and the frequency of its meetings, the
prime minister, the cabinet and ministerial responsibility, citizenship,
159. 9 D.L.R. 3d 473 (1969); see also MacKinnon, Booze, Religion, Indians and
the Canadian Bill of Rights, [1973] Pub. L. 295; Marx, The Canadian Bill of Rights
and R. v. Drybones-A New Outlook?, 24 N. IRE. LEGAL Q. 74 (1973).
160. 0. HOOD PHILLIPS, CONSTrrUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 76,
at 156-61.
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independence of the judiciary and so on. All this would involve the
most drastic constitutional transformation since Cromwell's short-lived
Instrument of Government.' 6'
161. S. GADINER, CONST1TUTIONAL DocumEduIr OF THE PurrAN REVOLUTION
1625-1660, 405 (Oxford, 3d ed., 1906).
